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NOTE:
Why Justice Kavanaugh Should Continue
Justice Kennedy’s Death Penalty
Legacy—Next Step: Expanding Juvenile
Death Penalty Ban
ALLI KATZEN*
As science and society both progress, Supreme Court
rulings should reflect those changes. The national consensus
has been gradually moving away from the use of the death
penalty, particularly as applied to offenders between the
ages of eighteen and twenty-five. Research clarifies that the
brain is not fully developed in the areas most directly linked
to culpability until after this age range. The combination of
these factors should compel the Court to raise the minimum
age for death sentences, but the shifting bench presents unpredictability.
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INTRODUCTION
“Even if true, teenagers!”1 This is the sentiment expressed by
Senator Scott Newman about the alleged sexual assaults committed
by future Supreme Court Justice Brett Kavanaugh when he was in
high school and college. While Justice Kavanaugh categorically denied the sexual assault claims, many of his defenders maintained
that even if the accusations were true, his previous actions should
not play a role in his confirmation to the highest court. In other
words, his actions as a teenager should not matter twenty or thirty
years later. But do Justice Kavanaugh and his supporters feel the
same is true about defendants who face the possibility of death—a
consequence lasting much longer than twenty or thirty years later—
for their actions taken before the age of twenty-five? If the Supreme
Court decides whether sentencing offenders under the age of

1

Senator Scott Newman (@SenatorNewmanMN), TWITTER (Sept. 17, 2018,
1:38 PM), https://twitter.com/SenatorNewmanMN/
status/1041758288440950787?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1041758288440950787&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2F
www.twincities.com%2F2018%2F09%2F18%2Fmn-senator-scott-newmanteenagers-tweet-over-brett-kavanaugh-sex-allegation-goes-viral%2F.
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twenty-five to death is constitutional, Justice Kavanaugh could be
viewed as a hypocrite if he votes in favor of such a sentence.
The Court has been on a path towards declaring the death penalty unconstitutional since 1972, when the Supreme Court effectively suspended imposition of the death penalty by holding that it
was unconstitutional as applied.2 Although the nationwide moratorium ended only a few years later when states amended their death
penalty statutes,3 the Supreme Court continued to limit the revised
statutes. Most notably, the Court struck down mandatory death sentences,4 death sentences for offenders who lacked the intention to
kill,5 death sentences for offenders with mental disabilities,6 and
death sentences for offenders who were under the age of eighteen at
the time of the offense.7
However, with the loss of the Court’s “pivotal swing vote” from
the bench,8 and the addition of the newest justice nominated by a
President who tweets thoughts like “SHOULD GET DEATH
PENALTY!” about criminal defendants,9 the future of death penalty
jurisprudence may be in jeopardy. This Note argues that death penalty jurisprudence should continue expanding the ban to apply to
offenders under the age of twenty-five. Furthermore, this Note will

2

See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
Olivia B. Waxman, The Story of the Last U.S. Execution Before a Nationwide Moratorium Took Effect 50 Years Ago, TIME (June 2, 2017),
http://time.com/4801230/last-execution-before-moratorium/.
4
See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
5
See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
6
See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
7
See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
8
Robert Barnes, Justice Kennedy, the Pivotal Swing Vote on the Supreme
Court, Announces His Retirement, WASH. POST (June 27, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/justice-kennedy-the-pivotal-swing-vote-on-the-supreme-court-announces-retirement/2018/06/27/a40a8c64-5932-11e7-a204-ad706461fa4f_story.html. On June
27, 2018, Justice Kennedy announced his resignation from the Court. Id.
9
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 1, 2017, 8:43
PM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/925931294705545216?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E925931294705545216&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.theguardian.com%2Fus-news%2F2018%2Fsep%2F06%2Fterrorist-attack-new-yorktrump-tweet-death-penalty.
3
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discuss why Justice Kavanaugh may, and should, continue Justice
Kennedy’s legacy as the swing vote in death penalty cases.
Part I of this Note overviews the relevant death penalty and juvenile sentencing cases. This Part introduces the proportionality
analysis that courts utilize in Eighth Amendment cases. Part II applies that proportionality analysis to death sentences imposed on offenders under the age of twenty-five. It first explores how the national consensus reflects society’s departure from the practice, and
then discusses pertinent brain development research that supports
this consensus. Part II concludes by showing why legitimate penological goals are not furthered by sentencing offenders under the age
of twenty-five to death. Finally, Part III assesses how this issue may
play out in the Court, with an analysis of Justice Kavanaugh’s preSupreme Court opinions and writings. This Note concludes that,
consistent with science, his own jurisprudence, and national and international trends, Justice Kavanaugh should vote against imposing
the death sentence on offenders under twenty-five if the issue is presented before him.
I. DEATH PENALTY AND JUVENILE SENTENCING JURISPRUDENCE
In the last two decades, the Court has made sweeping, categorical sentencing limitations applicable to specific groups of people: a
ban on death sentences for mentally disabled10 and juvenile offenders,11 a ban on life without the possibility of parole sentences for
juvenile non-homicide offenders,12 and most recently, a ban on mandatory life without parole sentencing schemes for juveniles.13 Ultimately, these cases turned on whether the sentence violates the
Eighth Amendment’s ban on “cruel and unusual punishments.”14
These landmark opinions provide insight and guidance on how the
Court arrives at its decisions through a process often referred to as
the “proportionality” analysis.15

10
11
12
13
14
15

See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 426 (2008).
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The concept of proportionality appears in Supreme Court opinions as far back as 1910, when the Court stated that “it is a precept
of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.”16 The Court explained that, while a punishment may not be cruel and unusual on its face, it may violate the
Eighth Amendment in light of the crime that fashioned the punishment or the offender whom it is punishing.17 While originalist interpreters of the Constitution may argue that a punishment should only
violate the Eighth Amendment if the Founders would have considered it to be cruel and unusual,18 the Supreme Court has repeatedly
rejected that interpretation in this context.19
The Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis is conducted
through the lens of the “evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society.”20 Although the cruel and unusual
Eighth Amendment “standard itself remains the same, . . . its applicability must change as the basic mores of society change.”21 For
the Court to assess if a punishment is disproportionate to a crime—
and therefore is cruel and unusual according to society’s current
standards—it looks at “objective factors to the maximum possible
extent.”22 The Court has “pinpointed that the ‘clearest and most

16

Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910).
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002) (“[E]ven though ‘imprisonment for ninety days is not, in the abstract, a punishment which is either cruel or
unusual,’ it may not be imposed as a penalty for ‘the “status” of narcotic addition’ . . . because such a sanction would be excessive.”) (quoting Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962)).
18
Originalist View of Death Penalty Under 8th Amendment, C-SPAN (Oct.
8, 2016), https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4624027/originalist-view-death-penalty-8th-amendment (clip, title, and description were not created by C-SPAN).
19
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311 (“A claim that punishment is excessive is judged
not by the standards that prevailed in 1685 when Lord Jeffreys presided over the
‘Bloody Assizes’ or when the Bill of Rights was adopted, but rather by those that
currently prevail.”).
20
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
21
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 382 (1972) (Burger, J., dissenting).
22
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (“Eighth Amendment judgments should not be, or appear to be, merely the subjective views of individual
Justices; judgment should be informed by objective factors to the maximum possible extent.”).
17
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reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is . . . legislation.’”23
This analysis is concluded “by asking whether there is reason to
disagree with the judgment reached by the citizenry and its legislators.”24 The Court must determine whether the penalty in question
furthers the penological goals that the death penalty is meant to address.25 As such, this Note will follow a similar approach to determine whether the death penalty ban should be extended to offenders
up to the age of twenty-five.
A. The Death Penalty as Disproportionate
Two cases that most clearly illustrate the Supreme Court’s application of the death penalty proportionality jurisprudence are Atkins v. Virginia26 and Roper v. Simmons.27 In 2002, the Atkins Court
imposed a categorical ban on death sentences for “mentally retarded
defendants.”28 The Court not only examined the number of states
that passed legislation banning the death penalty for the mentally
disabled, but it also looked at what was actually occurring in practice.29 It noted that despite the fact that less than half of the states
had passed such legislation, “the practice [was] uncommon” in the
states where it was still legal.30 When considered in combination
with the number of states that had an outright prohibition on the
death penalty for this class of defendants, the Court found that “a
national consensus ha[d] developed against” the execution of mentally disabled offenders.31
The Court decided that it had “no reason to disagree” with the
national consensus that had formed against the death penalty as a
punishment for the mentally disabled because such a punishment did
23

Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312 (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331
(1989)).
24
Id. at 313.
25
Id. at 319.
26
Id. at 304.
27
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
28
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319.
29
Id. at 314–16 (finding that after Congress passed legislation forbidding a
death sentence for mentally disabled defendants, at least eighteen states “followed
suit”).
30
Id. at 316.
31
Id.

970

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:964

not further the penological goals of a death sentence.32 The two
goals that the death penalty is meant to serve are retribution and deterrence.33 The theory of retribution rests upon “the interest in seeing
that the offender gets his ‘just deserts,’”34 or simply stated, the punishment that he deserves. Therefore, because a death sentence is the
most severe punishment, it should be reserved for only the most culpable offenders.35 The Court found that offenders who have “subaverage intellectual functioning” are less culpable, and ruled that when
it “appl[ied] the Eighth Amendment in the light of our ‘evolving
standards of decency,’” sentencing a “mentally retarded offender”
to death is forbidden under the Constitution.36
As the country’s national consensus increasingly rejected the use
of the death penalty for certain groups of offenders, the Court followed suit.37 Three years after Atkins was decided, the Court in
Roper v. Simmons made another categorical ban on the death penalty, this time for offenders under the age of eighteen.38 This ruling
was an extension of a previous Supreme Court decision, Thompson
v. Oklahoma, where the Court found the death penalty was unconstitutional for offenders under the age of sixteen.39 Just as the Atkins
Court began its analysis by examining the national consensus on the
issue, the Roper Court began with “a review of objective indicia of
[a national] consensus.”40
To assess the national consensus, both Atkins and Roper considered both legislative action and legislative restraint, emphasizing the
presence of legislation prohibiting the death penalty for the relevant
class of offenders.41 This was compounded by the lack of legislation
reinstating the death penalty where it had previously been abolished.42 After taking into account that no state “that previously prohibited capital punishment for juveniles” had reinstated it since the
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

Id. at 321.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976).
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319.
Id.
Id. at 321.
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005).
Id. at 578.
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
Roper, 543 U.S. at 564.
Id. at 566.
Id.
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last time the issue was before the Court, and that a majority of states
passed legislation banning the death penalty for juveniles, the Roper
Court found that the national consensus was against the juvenile
death penalty.43 The Court then exercised its “own independent
judgment” to determine whether it agreed with the national consensus as to “whether the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for juveniles.”44 Ultimately, it found that the punishment was
in fact disproportionate, and declared it unconstitutional as juveniles
“cannot with reliability be classified among the worst offenders” for
whom the death penalty is reserved.45
B. Juvenile Life Without Parole Sentencing as Disproportionate
The Court employs the proportionality analysis in two types of
cases: “challenges to the length of term-of-years sentences” and
“categorical restrictions on the death penalty.”46 The term-of-years
sentencing cases encompass restrictions on juvenile sentencing, and
therefore both groups of cases are critical to this Note, which advocates for banning the death penalty for a larger group of the population.
Five years after the Court declared that the death penalty is an
unconstitutional punishment for offenders under the age of eighteen,
the Court continued to categorize punishments as cruel and unusual
as applied to certain groups of people. In 2010, the Court declared
in Graham v. Florida that, in addition to the requirement that juveniles be exempt from the death penalty, they must also be exempt
from life without parole sentences if convicted of a non-homicidal
crime.47 While the Graham Court used the proportionality analysis,
it noted that this test was usually applied differently in non-death
penalty cases.48 Yet the approach previously seen in cases of
43
Id. at 564–67 (calculating that thirty states “prohibit[ed] the juvenile death
penalty, comprising 12 that ha[d] rejected the death penalty altogether and 18 that
maintain[ed] it but, by express provision or judicial interpretation, exclude[d] juveniles from its reach”).
44
Id. at 564.
45
Id. at 569.
46
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59 (2010).
47
Id at 82.
48
Id. at 60–62 (explaining that in challenges to term-of-years sentences the
“court must begin by comparing the gravity of the offense and the severity of the
sentence”). Justice Kennedy stated that it is difficult for a challenger in this type
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categorical restrictions to the death penalty is appropriate when “a
sentencing practice itself is in question,” as was the case in Graham.49
As such, the Court began its analysis by looking at the “objective
indicia of national consensus.”50 The Court rejected the State’s argument that there was no “national consensus against [sentencing
juvenile offenders to life without parole]” despite the underwhelming number of jurisdictions that prohibit such a sentence.51 The
Court explained that the State’s argument was “incomplete” because
legislation is not the only way to gauge consensus. Rather, “[a]ctual
sentencing practices are an important part of the Court’s inquiry into
consensus.”52 The actual sentencing practices revealed that there
was a national consensus against life without parole for juvenile
non-homicide offenders, evidenced by the fact that the practice was
the “most infrequent” in jurisdictions that did not legislate against
its use.53
When faced with another challenge against a juvenile sentencing
scheme, the Court followed the Roper and Graham Courts in finding

of case to succeed because the Eighth Amendment “‘does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence’ but rather ‘forbids only extreme sentences that [are] “grossly disproportionate” to the crime.’” If the Court makes the
rare finding that there is “an inference of gross disproportionality,” it then continues the analysis by comparing the sentence at issue with similar cases in other
jurisdictions. Only if the comparison confirms the Court’s inference does it then
find the punishment to be unconstitutional. Id. at 60 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001, 1005 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
49
Graham, 560 U.S. at 61–62.
50
Id. at 62.
51
Id. (“Six jurisdictions do not allow life without parole sentences for any
juvenile offenders . . . . Seven jurisdictions permit life without parole for juvenile
offenders, but only for homicide crimes . . . . Thirty-seven States as well as the
District of Columbia permit sentences of life without parole for a juvenile nonhomicide offender in some circumstances . . . . Federal law also allows for the
possibility of life without parole for offenders as young as 13.”)
52
Id.
53
Id. at 62–64 (finding that in practice, “only 11 jurisdictions nationwide in
fact impose life without parole sentences on juvenile nonhomicide offenders –
and most of those do so quite rarely – while 26 States, the District of Columbia,
and the Federal Government do not impose them despite apparent statutory authorization”).
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the practice unconstitutional.54 Mirroring the reasoning in Graham,
the Court in Miller v. Alabama considered the national consensus
against mandatory life without parole sentences for juvenile homicide offenders and again, focused heavily on what actual practices
suggested.55 In both Graham and Miller, the Court emphasized that
life without parole sentences for juveniles are akin to death sentences when imposed at such a young age.56 Thus, it concluded that
the penological goals were not served because young offenders are
more susceptible to rehabilitation, and in turn, found the practices to
be unconstitutional.57
II. APPLYING PROPORTIONALITY TO OFFENDERS UNDER TWENTYFIVE SENTENCED TO DEATH
As illustrated by the landmark cases discussed in Part I, the
Court relies heavily on objective indicia of a national consensus as
the initial part of its proportionality analysis.58 Accordingly, this
analysis begins by examining the application of death penalty to offenders under the age of twenty-five.
A. The Consensus
1. DEATH PENALTY LEGISLATION
The proportionality analysis is conducted to determine whether
a punishment is excessive under society’s evolving standards. Accordingly, the Court relies on objective factors to form its decision.59
A thorough analysis must begin with an examination of the pertinent
legislation, as it is “most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values.”60 A review of the nation’s legislation reveals a national
consensus against the death penalty overall. Currently, twenty states
and the District of Columbia have outlawed the use of the death penalty entirely, with eight of those states doing so after Roper was
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
Id. at 482–87.
See id. at 474; Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 70 (2010).
Miller, 567 U.S. at 489.
Id. at 482.
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311–12 (2002).
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989).
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decided in 2005.61 Of the thirty states that still permit the death penalty, three of them have imposed a moratorium since Roper.62 Although no state has passed legislation to extend the juvenile death
penalty ban beyond what is required by Roper, one state’s judiciary
has redrawn the line.63 In 2017, a Kentucky circuit court declared
the state’s death penalty statute unconstitutional as applied to offenders who were under the age of twenty-one at the time of the
offense.64 Thus, there are effectively twenty-four states and the District of Columbia that ban the death penalty for offenders under the
age of at least twenty-one, with twelve of these states having established the ban in the fifteen years since Roper was decided.65
Notably, there are few states that have reinstated the death penalty since abolishing it. Only Nebraska has done so, and only after a
dramatic political battle ensued.66 The Court has emphasized the importance of the inconsequential number of states that have legislated
to reinstate the death penalty compared to the many states that have
legislatively abolished it.67 The Atkins Court explained that, in light
of the “fact that anticrime legislation is far more popular than legislation providing protections for persons guilty of violent crime,” the
comparison between the number of states that reinstate the death
penalty and the amount of states that pass legislation to prohibit the
death penalty is “powerful evidence” of the national consensus.68
While, in Atkins, the comparison between the two numbers was
stark (zero states had reinstated the death penalty while sixteen had

61

States with and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.
(Oct. 11, 2018), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty.
62
Id.
63
See Commonwealth v. Bredhold, No. 14-CR-161, 2017 WL 8792559 (Ky.
Cir. Ct. Aug. 1, 2017).
64
Id.
65
States with and Without the Death Penalty, supra note 61.
66
Grant Schulte, Nebraska Set for Execution After About-Face on Death
Penalty,
AP
NEWS
(Aug.
13,
2018),
https://www.apnews.com/1f4837c843074ffca2d1684583334b00. In 2015, the Nebraska legislature voted to abolish the death penalty, only to have the bill vetoed by Governor
Ricketts. The legislature successfully overrode the veto, but a year later, Ricketts
poured his own money into a successful campaign to reinstate the death penalty.
67
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 566 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304, 315–16 (2002).
68
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315–16.
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abolished it since the issue was last before the Court),69 a less stark
contrast in Roper was still sufficient for the Court to find a national
consensus against the death penalty for juveniles.70 Although no
state restored the death penalty for juveniles in the fifteen years since
the Court approved the punishment,71 only five states had eradicated
the practice.72 The Roper Court professed that, while the “rate of
change” was “less dramatic” or “telling” than it was in Atkins, it was
still significant because it exemplified a trend.73
When comparing the rate of change that the Roper Court found
indicative of a national consensus against the juvenile death penalty
with the rate of change that has occurred since the Court last made
a categorical restriction on the death penalty based on age in Roper,
there appears to be a national consensus against the death penalty as
applied to offenders at least under the age of twenty-one, if not also
for offenders under the age of twenty-five.74 Five states abolished
and zero states reinstated the death penalty for juveniles in the fifteen years between Stanford and Roper.75 In the fifteen years since
the Court held that eighteen is the minimum age at which an offender may be sentenced to death, one state has raised the minimum
age to twenty-one,76 and eleven jurisdictions have abandoned the
death penalty altogether, albeit some only temporarily.77 Although
69

Id. There was a thirteen-year gap between 1989, when the Court decided
in Penry v. Lynaugh that sentencing a mentally disabled person to death was not
a violation of the Eighth Amendment, and when the Court confronted the same
issue in Atkins in 2002, overruling Penry. Compare id., with Penry v. Lynaugh,
492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989).
70
Roper, 543 U.S. at 565.
71
See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (holding imposition
of the death penalty “on any person who murders at 16 or 17 years of age . . . does
not offend the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment”).
72
Roper, 543 U.S. at 565.
73
Id. at 565–66 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315, n.18).
74
Id.
75
Roper, 543 U.S. at 565–66.
76
Commonwealth v. Bredhold, No. 14-CR-161, 2017 WL 8792559 (Ky. Cir.
Ct. Aug. 1, 2017).
77
Eight states (Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Maryland, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, and Washington) have abolished the death penalty since
Roper and three states (Colorado, Pennsylvania, and Oregon) have imposed gubernatorial moratoria since Roper. States with and Without the Death Penalty,
supra note 61.
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no state has specifically legislated to extend the juvenile restriction
to offenders under the age of twenty-five, the Court has continuously emphasized that “[i]t is not so much the number of these
[s]tates that is significant, but the consistency of the direction of
change.”78
Further evidencing the national consensus in favor of raising the
minimum age at which one may receive a death sentence, the American Bar Association (“ABA”) adopted a resolution in 2018 urging
jurisdictions to raise the minimum age above what is currently mandated by Roper.79 Considered to be the “voice of America’s legal
profession,” the ABA is highly influential and persuasive in deciding modern legal issues, and should therefore carry great weight
when expressing opinions on judicial matters.80
The trend is clear: states are increasingly abolishing the death
penalty entirely, rather than legislating the minimum age. 81 While
only one state has raised the minimum age, and only as high as age
twenty-one, and no state (or, more accurately, none out of the one
that raised the minimum age) has reinstated the death penalty for
offenders aged eighteen to twenty-five, it is nonetheless “powerful
evidence” that no state that prohibited the death penalty at the time
of Roper has since reinstated it.82
78

Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315.
A.B.A. Res. 111 (Feb. 2018). The resolution adopted a report that based its
finding on case law, brain development research, trends in legislation, and analysis of the penological goals, to determine that offenders who committed a crime
before the age of twenty-one should be barred from receiving a death sentence.
Id.
80
William C. Hubbard, Respect and Influence: The ABA’s Voice Is Strengthened by Members’ Efforts, A.B.A. J. (2015), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/respect_and_influence_the_abas_voice_is_strengthened_by_members_efforts.
81
However, since Kentucky recently became the first state to raise the minimum age past eighteen, rather than abolish the death penalty completely, other
conservative states may follow suit as raising the minimum age is less extreme
than outright abolition.
82
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316. Nebraska’s reinstatement of the death penalty in
2016 should not carry weight in the national consensus analysis. It has effectively
remained the same since Roper was decided, as Nebraska did not abolish the death
penalty until 2015 through a veto override. See Schulte, supra note 66. Thus, if
its reinstatement carried weight in the analysis, so too would its initial abolishment.
79
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Furthermore, the fact that only one state has raised the minimum
age above eighteen and none have gone as far as twenty-five is not
as damning to the state of the national consensus as it may appear at
first glance. In Graham, the Court explained that the “evidence of
consensus is not undermined by the fact that many jurisdictions do
not prohibit” the punishment at issue.83 The Court demonstrated that
the nature of the sentencing scheme and, thus, the actual sentencing
practice, revealed that although a great majority of jurisdictions had
not declared the sentencing practice at issue unconstitutional, “it
does not necessarily follow that the legislatures in those jurisdictions
have deliberately concluded that it would be appropriate.”84 Accordingly, the following Section will demonstrate how the death penalty
as applied in practice to offenders who were between eighteen and
twenty-five years old at the time of the offense is further evidence
of the national consensus against such practice.
2. ACTUAL PRACTICE
A tally reveals that thirty jurisdictions permit a death sentence
for offenders who were eighteen to twenty-five years old at the time
of the crime.85 Focusing on this number and ignoring the legislative
trend, a death penalty proponent may argue that this evidences a national consensus in favor of keeping the death penalty available for
eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds. However, that “argument is incomplete and unavailing.”86 Although the Court has declared legislation to be the most “reliable objective evidence of contemporary
values,” it is only a part of the national consensus analysis.87 In fact,
the Court has gradually removed the weight originally granted to
legislation and now places a heavier emphasis on the actual practices.88 If thirty-nine jurisdictions permit the sentence at issue, as
was the case in Graham, the narrow conclusion is that there is not a
national consensus against the sentence, and therefore, it is not a
83

Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 66 (2011).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
85
This tally is conservative because it includes the federal government, as
well as the three states that currently have gubernatorial moratoria in place. States
with and Without the Death Penalty, supra note 61.
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Graham, 560 U.S. at 62.
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Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989).
88
See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 482–86 (2012).
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disproportionate punishment under society’s evolving standards.89
Yet, just as this conclusion led the Court to find life without parole
for non-homicide juvenile offenders unconstitutional, the Court may
likewise find a death sentence for offenders who were eighteen to
twenty-five at the time of the offense to be unconstitutional simply
because thirty jurisdictions (including the federal government and
three states with moratoria) permit the practice.
While departing from the twenty-nine jurisdictions that permitted mandatory life without parole for juveniles, the Miller Court
stated that “simply counting [the jurisdictions that permit the sentence at issue] would present a distorted view.”90 A simple tally
warps the national consensus because, although many jurisdictions
may not have technically declared the sentence illegal, “an examination of actual sentencing practices” in those jurisdictions illuminates the national consensus in reality, rather than on paper.91
Twenty states permitted death sentences for mentally disabled
people when Atkins was decided, but in its finding of a national consensus against the practice, the Court focused on the legislative trend
away from the sentence, as well as the fact that it was an uncommon
practice in the jurisdictions in which it was permitted.92 Similarly,
when Roper was decided, twenty states permitted death sentences
for offenders under the age of eighteen.93 Mirroring the reasoning in
Atkins, the Roper Court found a national consensus against the juvenile death penalty based on the legislative trend and “infrequent”
practice.94

89

Id. at 483.
Id. at 482–83.
91
Graham, 560 U.S. at 62.
92
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002). In some of the states where
the death penalty was legal, executions had not “been carried out in decades,” and
there was therefore no need to legislate which groups to exclude from the death
penalty in those states. Id. In the states that executed more “regularly” and had no
ban on executing mentally disabled people, “only five ha[d] executed offenders
possessing a known IQ less than 70 since [the Court] decided Penry.” Id.
93
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005).
94
Id. at 564–65. Even though twenty states did not prohibit the juvenile death
penalty, in the fifteen years since Stanford was decided, only six of those states
actually executed offenders who committed crimes as juveniles. Id. In the latter
ten of those years, only three states executed offenders who were juveniles at the
time of the crime. Id.
90
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Unlike in Atkins and Roper, a majority of states permitted the
sentences at issue in Graham and Miller.95 Although thirty-nine jurisdictions permitted life without parole sentences for non-homicide
juvenile offenders when Graham was decided, the Court found that
only eleven states were actually imposing such sentences.96 The Miller Court found the State’s argument—that twenty-nine jurisdictions
allowing mandatory juvenile life without parole sentences demonstrated a national consensus in favor of the practice—to be a weak
point.97 Again, the Court explained that merely looking at the number of jurisdictions that permit the practice is a “distorted view” in
most cases.98 Once the Court in Miller considered the number of
states that send juveniles to adult court and then “do not have separate penalty provisions for those juvenile offenders,” as well as the
states that impose such mandatory sentences “by virtue of generally
applicable penalty provisions . . . without regard to age,” it found
that the apparent legislative trend was misleading.99
As illustrated by the four pertinent cases, the fact that a large
number of states permit a practice may not indicate a national consensus in favor of that practice. Twenty-six states currently lack any
prohibition against the death penalty for offenders who were eighteen to twenty-four at the time of the offense.100 This number is neither as low as the twenty states that permitted the sentences at issue
in Atkins and Roper, nor as high as the number of states in Graham
(thirty-nine) and Miller (twenty-nine).
How, then, is it possible that there is a national consensus rejecting the application of the death penalty to offenders under twentyfive at the time of the offense, and yet only one state has acted to
raise the minimum age beyond what is required by Roper? Actual
sentencing practices may provide insight as to how these two circumstances exist both simultaneously and in contradiction of one
another. Of the twenty-six states that permit death sentences for
95

See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 482–84 (2012).
Graham, 560 U.S. at 64.
97
Miller, 567 U.S. at 482.
98
Id. at 485.
99
Id. at 486.
100
States with and Without the Death Penalty, supra note 61. Although thirty
states permit the death penalty, Kentucky prohibits the death penalty for offenders
who were under the age of twenty-one at the time of the offense, and three additional states (Colorado, Pennsylvania, and Oregon) have moratoria imposed.
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offenders who were eighteen to twenty-five at the time of the offense, three have not carried out an execution in at least fifteen years,
four have not carried out an execution in at least ten years, and six
have not carried out an execution in at least five years.101 In practice,
only half of the twenty-six states have carried out executions in the
past five years, and only eight did so in 2017 or 2018.102 Furthermore, Texas alone carried out more than half of the total executions
in 2018.103 Removing Texas as the outlier, it becomes clear that
overall, executions are quite rare nationwide, with seven states carrying out one to three executions each in the past year.104
An even smaller fraction of states is responsible for executing
offenders who were eighteen to twenty-four at the time of their offense. While eight states carried out executions in 2018, only four
of those states executed offenders who were under the age of twentyfive when the offense was committed, and only one state executed
an offender who was under twenty-one.105 Overall, seven people
who were under the age of twenty-five at the time of their offense
were executed in 2018. The majority of these seven were sentenced
to death before Roper was decided, which was before brain
101

John Gramlich, 11 States That Have the Death Penalty Haven’t Used It in
More than a Decade, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 10, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/08/10/11-states-that-have-the-death-penalty-haventused-it-in-more-than-a-decade/. Since Gramlich’s article was written, the numbers have changed; Nebraska carried out its first execution since 1997, South Dakota carried out its first execution since 2012, and Washington abolished the death
penalty. See Jon Herskovitz, Nebraska Carries out Its First Execution Since 1997,
REUTERS (Aug. 14, 2018, 6:08 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nebraska-execution/nebraska-carries-out-its-first-execution-since-1997idUSKBN1KZ11M; Associated Press, After 7-Hour Delay, South Dakota Carries
out First Execution Since 2012, SIOUXLAND NEWS (Oct. 29, 2018),
https://siouxlandnews.com/news/local/south-dakota-carries-out-first-executionsince-2012; States with and Without the Death Penalty, supra note 61.
102
The Death Penalty in 2018: Year End Report, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/2018YrEnd.pdf (last visited Jan. 5,
2019).
103
Id. Texas carried out thirteen of the twenty-five total executions in 2018.
Id.
104
Id. Three states carried out one execution, three states carried out two executions, and one state carried out three executions, in addition to the thirteen people that Texas executed. Id.
105
Execution List 2018, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/execution-list-2018 (last visited Jan. 5, 2019).
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development research exploded.106 Therefore, an examination of
death sentences handed down in 2018 is even more revealing of the
national consensus against the death penalty for offenders under the
age of twenty-five. Forty-two death sentences were imposed in
2018, yet only eight of those offenders were under twenty-five at the
time of the offense, and none were under the age of twenty-one.107
These numbers are even more illuminating in light of the fact that in
2017, the age group that comprised the largest volume of convicted
murderers was twenty- to twenty-four-year-olds.108
In light of the actual practice of death sentences applied to this
group of young offenders, the fact that only one state has raised the
minimum age of the death penalty is not indicative of the lack of
consensus. Because the practice is so uncommon, “there is little
need to pursue legislation barring the execution” of offenders who
were under the age of twenty-five at the time of the offense.109 The
vast majority of states either outright abolished the death penalty for
all ages, do not actively sentence people to death, or do not actually
administer executions, particularly for offenders under the age of
twenty-five. Therefore, it is fair to conclude that the jurisdictions
that permit the practice on paper have not “endorsed [such a sentence] through deliberate, express, and full legislative consideration,” because the issue rarely arises in those states.110 “[I]t is fair to
say that a national consensus has developed against”111 executing
offenders who were under the age of twenty-five at the time of the
offense.
3. SOCIETY HAS ALREADY REDRAWN THE LINE; DEATH
PENALTY JURISPRUDENCE NEEDS TO CATCH UP
Beyond just the scope of death penalty legislation and practices,
broader cultural notions are indicative of a national consensus in
106
Id. Carey Dean Moore was twenty-one at the time of the offense, which
occurred thirty-eight years before he was finally executed in 2018. Id.
107
Death Sentences in 2018, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/2018-sentencing (last visited Jan. 5, 2019).
108
Number of Murder Offenders in the United States in 2017, by Age,
STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/251884/murder-offenders-in-theus-by-age/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2019).
109
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002).
110
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 67 (2011).
111
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316.
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favor of raising the minimum age for death sentences. General
trends in treating young adults differently when they reach age
eighteen, twenty-one, and twenty-five are present throughout society. The Roper Court opened the door to criticism when it admitted
that it settled on the age of eighteen at which to redraw “the line for
death eligibility” merely because that is “the point where society
draws the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood.”112 The Court was right—“[d]rawing the line at 18 years of
age is subject, of course, to the objections always raised against categorical rules.”113 While the Roper Court’s reasoning for drawing
the line at eighteen may have been a legitimate “meaningful basis”
in 2005, that line must be updated to reflect not only modern scientific research, but also societal norms.114 This Section will describe
the ways in which society draws the line between childhood and
adulthood after age eighteen, and, therefore, why the Court’s categorical rule must be revised.
It is true that traditionally, and in some ways still today, society
considers a person an adult on his or her eighteenth birthday.115 Society is well aware that “[t]he qualities that distinguish juveniles
from adults do not disappear when an individual turns 18.”116 The
idea that a person becomes an adult at age eighteen is reinforced by
the fact that many legal rights are granted on one’s eighteenth birthday and are enshrined in amendments to the Constitution. However,
one of the most notable rights in this category, the right to vote, was
not always available to Americans at age eighteen.117 The right to
vote was originally granted at the age of twenty-one, and only lowered to age eighteen when Congress could not justify drafting young
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Roper v. Simmons, 534 U.S. 551, 574 (2005).
Id.
114
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring) (explaining that there must be a “meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases
in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not”).
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Jennifer Lai, Old Enough to Vote, Old Enough to Smoke?, SLATE (Apr. 23,
2013, 7:37 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2013/04/new-york-minimum-smoking-age-why-are-young-people-considered-adults-at-18.html.
116
Roper, 534 U.S. at 574.
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Jocelyn Benson & Michael T. Morley, The Twenty-Sixth Amendment,
CONST. CTR., https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/amendments/amendment-xxvi (last visited Jan. 7, 2019).
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men to fight in Vietnam if those same men were deprived the right
to vote and express a voice on the war in which they would fight.118
Yet, because “[a]dulthood is a social construct,” it is amorphous
and changes as society learns and grows.119 As such, the period that
marks the beginning of adulthood has changed in the last few decades, and legislatures have recognized and implemented that
change. Now coined as a time of “emerging adulthood,” the modern
generation of eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds are beginning
adulthood much later than previous generations.120 As graduate degrees have become more common, people are getting married later,
having children later, and “settling into long-term adult roles”
later.121 Based on these social developments, as well as brain development research that will be discussed infra Section II.B, legislatures have enacted statutes since Roper that question the social significance that the Court gives to the age of eighteen.122
In fact, a study of “objective indicia of consensus, as expressed
in particular by the enactments of legislatures that have addressed
the question”123 regarding what age to separate children from adults
reveals that societal “adulthood” has moved well beyond the age of
eighteen. Legislatures have shifted the line as far as age twentysix—the Affordable Care Act allows an individual to avoid the burden of securing their own health insurance until age twenty-six by
staying on his or her parent’s health insurance plan.124 The United
States Sentencing Commission has defined youthful offenders as
“persons age 25 or younger.”125 The Internal Revenue Service
118

The 26th Amendment, HISTORY, https://www.history.com/topics/unitedstates-constitution/the-26th-amendment (last visited Jan. 7, 2019).
119
Julie Beck, When Are You Really an Adult?, ATLANTIC (Jan. 5, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2016/01/when-are-you-really-anadult/422487/.
120
Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, Emerging Adulthood: A Theory of Development
from the Late Teens Through the Twenties, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 469, 469
(2000).
121
Id.
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Roper v. Simmons, 534 U.S. 551, 574 (2005).
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Id. at 564.
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How to Get or Stay on a Parent’s Plan, HEALTHCARE.GOV,
https://www.healthcare.gov/young-adults/children-under-26/ (last visited Jan. 7,
2019).
125
WILLIAM H. PRYOR, JR. ET AL., Youthful Offenders in the Federal System,
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SENTENCING
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(May
2017),
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permits students under the age of twenty-four to remain as dependents on their parents’ tax forms.126 For purposes of federal student
aid funding, the Department of Education considers students under
twenty-three-years-old to be dependents, “assumed to have the support of parents.”127 The federal government restricts individuals under the age of twenty-one from purchasing guns.128 Notably, all of
these examples that characterize individuals as adults at an age
above twenty-one are federal, and hence, represent the national consensus.
However, federal agencies do not act radically or alone. The federal government incentivizes states through funding to allow individuals to remain in foster programs up to the age of twenty-one;
half of all states take part in this program.129 Four states consider
offenders up to the age of twenty-four to be juveniles insofar as they
are allowed to “remain under juvenile court jurisdiction.”130 At least
thirteen states maintain youthful offender statutes that apply to individuals up to the age of twenty-five.131 This number is growing. Vermont passed legislation effective in 2018 to raise the youthful offender age from seventeen to twenty-one.132 In addition, the federal
government has been incentivizing states to maintain the minimum
legal drinking age at twenty-one through the use of highway funding

https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/researchpublications/2017/20170525_youthful-offenders.pdf.
126
Dependents and Exemptions, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/faqs/filing-requirements-status-dependents-exemptions/dependents-exemptions/dependents-exemptions-2 (last updated Dec. 13, 2018).
127
Federal Student Aid, OFFICE U.S. DEPT. EDUC., https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/fafsa/filling-out/dependency (last visited Jan. 7, 2019).
128
18 U.S.C § 922(b)(1) (2018).
129
Extending Foster Care Beyond 18, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (July
28, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/extending-foster-careto-18.aspx.
130
Delinquency Age Boundaries, JUV. JUST. GEOGRAPHY, POL’Y, PRAC. &
STAT, http://www.jjgps.org/jurisdictional-boundaries#delinquency-age-boundaries?year=2016&ageGroup=3 (last visited March 3, 2020).
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REV. 72, 81–87 (2017).
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since 1984.133 Some states have extended that minimum age to the
ability to purchase cigarettes.134
These are only a fraction of the policies that draw the line at an
age above eighteen, oftentimes as old as age twenty-five. Reflective
of the trend in favor of drawing the line distinguishing juveniles
from adults at a later age, the nation is seeing a rapid increase in
such legislation, largely as a result of what is now known about brain
development.135
B. The Science to Back it Up
The national consensus is clear—the nation is against the practice of sentencing offenders who were younger than twenty-five at
the time of the offense to death and is in favor of redrawing the legal
line marking the start of adulthood at least at the age of twenty-one,
if not higher. Society has evolved in this direction as a result of its
changing culture and advancing scientific research. The period of
emerging adulthood—ages eighteen to twenty-five—is “characterized by change and exploration,” rather than marriage and babies as
it was for prior generations.136 The reason for this cultural shift may
be explained by recent studies on brain development, which demonstrate that the brain is not finished developing until much later than
older studies suggested.137
When the Court engages in a proportionality analysis, it must
“consider reasons for agreeing or disagreeing” with the national
consensus after it establishes that one exists.138 The Roper Court
sided with the national consensus against the death penalty for offenders under the age of eighteen when it exercised its “own independent judgment” because it found brain development research
proved younger offenders to be less culpable offenders.139 Brain
133

23 U.S.C. § 158 (2018).
Raising the Tobacco Age to 21, CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS,
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30, 2018).
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development research was only first emerging in a mainstream way
in 2005 when Roper was decided, and as a result, it was essentially
the first time that the Court relied on neuroscience in a “decision[]
about developmental differences between adolescents and
adults.”140 This was likely a factor in the Court’s hesitancy to raise
the minimum death penalty age higher than eighteen.
However, since 2005, it has become “well established” that
“characteristic developmental changes” in the brain are “not complete until approximately twenty-five years of age.”141 Crucially, the
part of the brain that remains underdeveloped into the mid-twenties
is the same part of the brain that the Court found reduced the culpability of juvenile offenders—the prefrontal cortex.142 The prefrontal
cortex’s stage of development can explain the reasoning behind an
immature decision that has consequences of life or death, as it “plays
a central and pervasive role in human cognition.”143 It is the part of
the brain that allows an individual to “exercise good judgment when
presented with difficult life situations,” “control the expression of
intense emotions,” control “impulse,” and resist making risky decisions in the presence of friends.144
An informed appreciation of the effects of an underdeveloped
prefrontal cortex in young adults supports what has long been illustrated by crime data showing that “young adult crime does not define offenders, but rather is ‘a transitory state that they age out
of.’”145
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C. Penological Goals
As with all Eighth Amendment proportionality analyses before
the Court, national consensus does not conclude the inquiry on a
proper legal threshold of adulthood. Though “evolving standards”
and “objective evidence of contemporary values”146 carry great
weight, the Court must also use “its independent judgment.”147 To
make a determination regarding the constitutionality of a punishment, the Court must look to the root of the question that the proportionality analysis poses: is the punishment disproportionate to the
crime?148 The final judgment is informed by precedent and the
Court’s “own understanding of the Constitution and the rights it secures.”149
Because “the death penalty is the most severe punishment, the
Eighth Amendment applies to it with special force.”150 The Court
has labeled its death penalty jurisprudence as “narrowing,” as it
“seeks to ensure that only the most deserving of execution are put to
death.”151 As such, to be considered a constitutionally permissible
punishment, the death penalty as applied must “measurably contribute[] to one or both” of the penological goals which the death penalty seeks to further; otherwise, the punishment “‘is nothing more
than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering,’
and hence [is] an unconstitutional punishment.”152
The Supreme Court’s precedent makes clear that for the same
reasons that the state’s penological goals are not furthered by sentencing juveniles to death, they likewise are not furthered by sentencing offenders under the age of twenty-five to death. In Roper,
the Court pointed to specific differences between juveniles and
adults that require juveniles to be excluded from the group of “offenders who commit a narrow category of the most serious crimes”
for whom capital punishment is reserved.153 The Court found that
146
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the presence of characteristics such as “lack of maturity,” “underdeveloped sense of responsibility,” “vulnerab[ility] . . . to negative influences,” and lack of “well formed” character in juveniles “often
result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions.”154 The
Court held that because of these differences, juveniles are less culpable offenders, and imposing the death penalty on them would not
serve any penological goal.155
Because recent studies now clarify that the characteristics that
make juveniles less culpable do not fully fade until the age of
twenty-five,156 it follows logically that offenders under the age of
twenty-five have diminished culpability.157 Thus, neither of the
death penalty’s penological goals is served when applied to offenders under the age of twenty-five.
Retribution hinges on the culpability of the offender.158 It is “not
proportional if the law’s most severe penalty is imposed on one
whose culpability or blameworthiness is diminished, to a substantial
degree, by reason of youth and immaturity.”159 The part of the brain
that develops last controls an individual’s ability to resist impulses
and the urge to engage in reckless behavior.160 These are the same
characteristics that the Court cited as causing juveniles to be less
culpable and thus, the juvenile death penalty less serving of retributive goals.161
The goal of deterrence is likewise not met. The Roper Court
found that “the same characteristics that render juveniles less culpable [make them] less susceptible to deterrence.”162 In particular, the
inability of juveniles to engage in a “‘cost-benefit analysis’” led the
Court to find an “absence of evidence of deterrent effect.”163 Now
that research has established that the prefrontal cortex remains
154
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underdeveloped “well into the 20s,” the same inability to consider
consequences and “take stock of a situation” likely causes offenders
under the age of twenty-five to be less responsive to deterrence.164
Because brain development occurs gradually as individuals
grow closer to the age of twenty-five, they are likely to have a more
developed prefrontal cortex and their culpability is less likely to be
diminished by “a substantial degree.”165 Therefore, if the Court
raises the minimum death penalty age to twenty-five, there will be
some offenders who are able to skirt the death penalty merely because of their age, despite potentially deserving the most severe punishment. Yet, the same was said about eighteen-year-olds when
Roper was decided.166
The Court acknowledged that one of the problems with drawing
the categorical line at eighteen is that “some under 18 have already
attained a level of maturity some adults will never reach.”167 As a
society, we must ask whether we would rather spare the lives of our
nation’s youth, whose underdeveloped brains may have resulted in
the commission of a heinous crime, or protect the “express[ion of]
the community’s moral outrage” at the risk of killing offenders
whose immaturity overshadowed their culpability.168 National consensus appears to weigh more heavily in favor of the former, and as
neither penological goal is served by sentencing offenders under
twenty-five to death, the Court should follow that consensus.
Not only does sentencing offenders under the age of twenty-five
to death fail to “measurably contribute[] to one or both” of the penological goals, these offenders are also superior candidates for alternative punishments.169 This age group is at a stage of “heightened
plasticity,” which makes them easily influenced by experiences.170
As a result, they are the most susceptible to the benefits of

164

Johnson et al., supra note 160, at 217.
Roper, 543 U.S. at 571.
166
Id. at 574.
167
Id.
168
Id. at 571.
169
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982).
170
Laurence Steinberg, The Case for Delayed Adulthood, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
19, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/21/opinion/sunday/the-case-fordelayed-adulthood.html.
165

990

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:964

rehabilitation, a penological goal arguably served by imprisonment,
but certainly not by death.171
III. THE COURT SHOULD FIND SENTENCING OFFENDERS UNDER
TWENTY-FIVE TO DEATH UNCONSTITUTIONAL—BUT WILL IT?
The addition of two Supreme Court justices in less than two
years brings great uncertainty to the future of many controversial
topics, including death penalty jurisprudence. How the new Court
will decide death penalty cases is of particular intrigue for two reasons. First, Justice Anthony Kennedy’s retirement means the loss of
the key swing vote in death penalty cases, and second, Justice Brett
Kavanaugh’s stance cannot be reasonably predicted, as he has yet to
directly confront the issue.
A. Kennedy’s Legacy
Although appointed by a Republican president172 and considered
to be a “lifelong Republican,”173 Justice Kennedy was “never a reliable conservative.”174 While it is true that he cast more conservative
than liberal votes in his three decades on the bench, many landmark
cases would not have resulted in liberal decisions absent Justice
Kennedy’s vote.175 Death penalty law is one area in which Justice
Kennedy cast votes and authored majority opinions that contributed
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to his reputation as “the pivotal swing vote.”176 Most notably, Justice
Kennedy wrote the Roper 5–4 majority opinion, which declared the
juvenile death penalty unconstitutional.177 He also wrote the majority opinion that declared the death penalty unconstitutional for nonhomicide offenses, also a 5-4 decision.178 He wrote the Graham majority opinion, declaring that life without parole sentences for juveniles who committed non-homicide offenses are unconstitutional.179
And finally, he provided the swing vote necessary for the Court’s
decision that mandatory life without parole sentences for juveniles
are unconstitutional.180
Notwithstanding the individuals ages eighteen to twenty-five
who continue to be sentenced to death and life without parole despite immature brain functioning, without Justice Kennedy, the
numbers would be much more alarming. Justice Kennedy’s powerful swing vote essentially granted him the power to control the jurisprudential meaning of the Eighth Amendment.181 His retirement
may also mean the loss of the Court as “a venue for a systemic attack
on capital punishment.”182
B. Kavanaugh’s Future
It is difficult to predict whether Justice Kennedy’s successor will
continue his legacy of supporting defendants’ rights. Justice
Kavanaugh did not encounter any death penalty related cases during
his twelve years on the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, nor was he
confronted with any questions regarding his views on the death
penalty during the confirmation process.183 Regardless, many
176
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scholars predict that the replacement of Justice Kennedy with “a
more doctrinaire law-and-order conservative”184 is not just a setback
for death penalty jurisprudence, but rather “a death knell.”185 While
Justice Kennedy has been described as a “heterodox jurist,” Justice
Kavanaugh is considered “a reliably conservative judge.”186
Yet contrary to what many scholars are predicting,187 the Court’s
steady trend away from the constitutionality of the death penalty188
may not be halted by Justice Kavanaugh. Prior to his confirmation
to the Supreme Court, Justice Kavanaugh was only involved in one
case involving a death row inmate, and it did not involve any Eighth
Amendment analysis.189 Therefore, it is necessary to analyze Justice
Kavanaugh’s writings and public speeches to produce an informed
projection. This Section will provide two reasons why Justice
Kavanaugh should find death sentences unconstitutional for
offenders under the age of twenty-five, should the issue come before
the Court.
First, Justice Kavanaugh’s views on sentencing inform how he
may decide death penalty cases. He has expressed the opinion that
courts should return to a mandatory sentencing system, particularly
because judges naturally “bring their own personal philosophies
[and] their personal views on particular issues into the
courtroom.”190 Because he has expressed concern about disparities
that often result from advisory guidelines, he has consistently
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pushed for a mandatory sentencing system.191 Although Justice
Kavanaugh did not refer specifically to death sentences, the death
penalty is applied more disparately than any other sentence, with
only eight states using the practice in 2018.192 Because the Supreme
Court has already held that mandatory death sentences are
unconstitutional, the only solution to this sentencing disparity
through implementation of a mandatory system is to make it
unconstitutional. If Justice Kavanaugh intends to remain consistent
with his jurisprudence on mandatory uniform sentencing guidelines,
he would need to either err on the side of eliminating the death
penalty, or support making the death penalty mandatory for certain
offenses.
Second, Justice Kavanaugh “emphatically” dissented when the
majority held that despite the “mandatory thirty-year sentence for
any person who carries a machine gun while committing a crime of
violence,” the government is not required “to prove that the
defendant knew the weapon he was carrying was capable of firing
automatically.”193 In other words, the majority ruled that even if the
defendant was not aware that the weapon he was carrying was a
machine gun, he must receive this mandatory sentence.194 Justice
Kavanaugh expressed disturbance with the court’s imposition of “an
extra 20 years of mandatory imprisonment based on a fact the
defendant did not know.”195 He called this practice “unjust and
incompatible with deeply rooted principles of American law.”196
In the same way that it is unjust to imprison a defendant for
twenty additional years by “dispensing with mens rea,” it is likewise
unjust to sentence offenders under the age of twenty-five to death.197
Discounting mens rea, or the intent to commit an act, is analogous
to ignoring the fact that eighteen to twenty-five-year-olds lack the
physical ability to properly assess options and make decisions,
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exacerbated in the presence of peer pressure or negative emotions,
which are often factors in adolescent crime.198
Because Justice Kavanaugh stated that “[t]he debate over mens
rea is not some philosophical or academic exercise,” as “[i]t has major real-world consequences for criminal defendants,” he should recognize that there should be no debate over sentencing offenders under the age of twenty-five to death—the most severe real-world consequence.199 This is not a simple policy debate—scientists have
proven that individuals under the age of twenty-five lack developed
brain functions, making them less capable of having the required
mens rea, and therefore less culpable. These individuals are not the
most culpable offenders, and, therefore, should not be sentenced
with the harshest punishment. Justice Kavanaugh similarly concluded that when a defendant lacks mens rea, they have a lessened
“moral depravity.”200
CONCLUSION
As society evolves and develops, the barbaric punishments of
the past become recognized as such. Legislative trends and actual
practices demonstrate the movement against applying the death penalty to offenders who were under the age of twenty-five at the time
of the crime and show the favorability of redrawing the line that distinguishes juveniles from adults above age eighteen. Moreover, the
nation is not evolving faster than the rest of the world. In fact, the
United States is the only country in the western hemisphere that
committed executions in 2017.201 As more countries enact legislation to abolish the death penalty and fewer countries impose and
carry out executions, it is clear that “the global trend [is] towards
abolition of the death penalty.202
Given the opportunity to decide the question of whether death
sentences are a constitutional punishment for offenders under the
198
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age of twenty-five, the Court should consider these trends in its proportionality analysis. Moreover, it should find no reason to disagree
with the consensus because of the scientific research on brain development. The Court should rely on the same reasoning it applied in
Roper and extend the ban to offenders under twenty-five, as science
now confirms that the same characteristics that make juveniles less
culpable remain until at least the age of twenty-five.203 Once it recognizes the diminished culpability of offenders under twenty-five,
the Court must find that neither retribution nor deterrence justifies
sentencing these offenders to death. Thus, the punishment is disproportionate to the crime and must be declared unconstitutional.
Many political tides have turned since 2015 when Justice Scalia
said that he “wouldn’t be surprised if the [C]ourt voted to abolish
[the death penalty] soon.”204 With a crucial swing voter gone and
the addition of two conservative justices, only time will tell if Justice
Scalia’s predictions were accurate. However, if Justice Kavanaugh
follows his own logic and precedent, he very well may rule against
the death penalty for offenders under twenty-five.
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